



The affective life of ‘anti-gender’ mobilisations 
 
We had already clocked him pacing at the back. A latecomer, ill fitting in the 
book-lined library: white man in his forties, baggy clothes, shaved hair and 
prominent facial scar jarring with the 120 groomed young people in the room, all 
facing forward, rapt by Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw’s invocations to think and 
act intersectionally.1 He moves to lean on a pillar. My hackles rise, prickling 
down my spine. I tell myself that I have been working in an elite institution for 
too long and need to check my judgment; those hackles go down a bit. I am about 
to go and ask him if he would like to sit down and join us, when he starts to 
speak over Kimberlé. Both she and I know he is not going to stop; it’s hardly our 
first encounter with attempted silencing. The man speaks louder and so does 
Kimberlé. His diatribe in Italian shows he isn’t interested in dialogue; her 
American tones echo behind me. I walk straight up the aisle to about a foot away 
from him and raise my hands. Please stop talking over our guest; please sit down. 
Then, when he doesn’t stop: please leave. He backs me up the way I have just 
come, and I keep the same distance – the two speakers now in discordant unison. 
Please stop talking over our guest, please leave this workshop, please be respectful, 
please leave. I manoeuvre him back up the aisle and he is shouting invective now, 
dirty ugly feminist, shut up ugly bitch. I don’t really need the translation from 
Italian provided by students later. He is by the door he came in now, and as I 
back him up through the door, he grabs and twists my arm in a last ditch effort, 
then turns and shouts his way out, to be met by the security guards the PhD 
student stewards have already called. They wrestle him out of the building, and 
we can hear his echoes for minutes after we can no longer see him. 
I am shaking. Kimberlé is shaking, students are shaking, some crying. 
Kimberlé breathes in her experience of decades and breathes out the last ninety 
minutes of an extraordinary workshop. She opens herself to the students’ shock 
and anger and knits their experience back together with the intersectional 
theory they have read and thought they would simply be asked to say something 
clever about. One student tells us about her fear: that she would lose the hearing 
in her other ear, having lost it in one after being beaten by Hindu nationalists.  
Another whispers that she was looking for a table to hide under, as she had when 
that man came into the classroom and started shooting. We talk about our own 
privilege and this man’s likely mental health issues, as well as the ways in which 
anti-feminism has always exploited subjective as well as collective 
vulnerabilities. We make the transnational connections across forms of anti-
feminist, racist, homophobic and transphobic violence, and feel enraged at the 
possibility of our silence. We express feeling shame too, that we could not 
effectively interrupt this man without passing him over to security. What were 
we waiting for? An institutional response, perhaps, despite our collective 
schooling in the misogyny, classism and racism of institutions.   
This article addresses the attacks on feminism and Gender Studies by an 
increasingly virulent anti-‘gender ideology’ movement, and asks after the best 
 
1 Crenshaw gave this cross-departmental workshop on ‘Intersectionality and Politics: An 
Interactive Workshop with Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw’, on Monday 21st January 2019 hosted 
by the Gender Studies Department at the LSE. 
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ways of grappling with the violence of these mobilisations at political, epistemic 
and collective levels. As is well documented, attacks on the concept of ‘gender’ 
and on feminist, anti-homophobic and intersectional social movements are a 
central part of how a right-wing populist agenda generates its appeal and 
furthers its aims.2 ‘Gender Ideology’, or the concept of ‘gender’ itself, has been 
consistently set up as eroding family values, challenging the natural status of 
heterosexual gender roles, and promoting perversion. Sonia Corrêa, David 
Patternote and Roman Kuhar describe these right-wing movements as operating 
at a transnational level, but focusing on a national or local scale,3 bringing 
together homophobic campaigns in France, Germany and Brazil,4 the defence of 
sovereignty in Poland, Serbia and Hungary, and religious reintrenchments in 
Costa Rica, Chile and Uganda.5 While the demonisation of feminism by the Right 
is hardly new, I agree with Kuhar and Patternote’s suggestion that there is an 
increased fervour within these national as well as transnational movements that 
targets ‘gender ideology’ as a particular threat to national and local security, 
providing the perfect confluence of misogyny, homophobia and racism.6  
There have been consistent attacks on Gender Studies as a field in recent 
years, with the closure of the degree at Central European University (CEU) in 
Budapest,7 the attempted bombing at the National Secretariat for Gender 
Research at the University of Göteborg,8 and most recently the June 2020 
legislative move to ban ‘gender identity studies in schools and universities’ in 
Romania.9 It is not that such campaigns have a central architecture (or 
architects), but more that their reliance on anti-‘gender ideology’ is precisely 
what allows for a transnational response to bring together otherwise disparate 
interests. As Andrea Pető notes in her protest at the closure of Gender Studies at 
CEU, ‘the concept of “gender” is used to mobilize very different political forces to 
 
2 Elizabeth S. Corredor, ‘Unpacking “Gender Ideology” and the Global Right’s Antigender 
Countermovement’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 44: 3 (Spring 2019) 
.3 Sonia Corrêa, David Patternote and Roman Kuhar, ‘The Globalisation of Anti-Gender 
Campaigns: Transnational Anti-Gender Movements in Europe and Latin America Create Unlikely 
Alliances’, International Politics and Society, 31 May 2018, https://www.ips-
journal.eu/topics/human-rights/article/show/the-globalisation-of-anti-gender-campaigns-
2761/ 
4 See Eva von Redecker, ‘Anti-Genderismus and Right-wing Hegemony’, Radical Philosophy 198 
(Jul/Aug 2016) and Joseph Jay Sosa, ‘Subversive, Mother, Killjoy: Sexism Against Dilma Rousseff 
and the Social Imaginary of Brazil’s Rightward Turn’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society 44: 3 (Spring 2019). 
5 A 2019 special issue in Signs provides a useful collection of articles from different locations that 
make the argument for both national and transnational right-wing attacks on ‘gender ideology’: 
Agnieszka Graff, Ratna Kapur and Suzanne Walters, ‘Introduction: Gender and the Rise of the 
Global Right’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 44: 3 (Spring 2019). 
6 Roman Kuhar and David Patternote, eds, Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing Against 
Equality (London: Roman and Littlefield, 2017). 
7 Andrea Pető, ‘Attack on Freedom of Education in Hungary: the Case of Gender Studies’, 
Engenderings, 24 September 2018, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2018/09/24/attack-on-
freedom-of-education-in-hungary-the-case-of-gender-studies/ 
8 Jennifer Evands, ‘The New War on Gender Studies’, The Conversation, 6 Jan 2019, 
https://theconversation.com/the-new-war-on-gender-studies-109109 
9 https://www.euronews.com/2020/06/17/romania-gender-studies-ban-students-slam-new-
law-as-going-back-to-the-middle-ages. The case is now awaiting constitutional review, after 
President Iohannis submitted an appeal after pressure from within and outside of Romania: 
https://eua.eu/news/536:romanian-president-moves-to-reject-ban-on-gender-studies.html 
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construct one, united enemy to hate’.10 Attempts to control the curriculum also 
characterised the mobilisation of divergent political strands in the Manif Pour 
Tous movement in France, which claimed that recognition of gay marriage would 
undermine complementary roles as the natural basis of marriage, and that the 
teaching of ‘gender’ to children was a politically motivated absurdity.11 Efforts to 
stop teaching ‘genderism’ in Germany similarly drew on what Eva von Redecker 
describes as ‘the resentful mobilization against pluralism and “political 
correctness”, which are perceived as instituted by “gender ideologues”.’12 The 
aggression that characterises this hostility is not only directed at legislative or 
institutional contexts; the derision towards ‘gender’ as a category is also directed 
towards its proponents. In Germany, for example, complaints seeking to remove 
Gender Studies teachers from the university were and remain vitriolic. In 
Hungary, Pető was subject to extensive harassment. In Brazil, feminists on 
university campuses endure consistent personal abuse, accused not only of 
violating nature, but exhibiting national betrayal in their adopting of ‘foreign’ 
terms of reference. In November 2017, while she was visiting Rio, right-wing 
activists burned Judith Butler in effigy, marking ‘gender’, ‘(homo)sexuality’ and 
‘Americanness’ as equally vile (and subject to violence).13  
Anti-‘gender ideology’ proponents frame their own project as a moderate, 
commonsense one that protects natural sex roles and the relationship between 
family and nation. It is always others who are the aggressors: feminists who 
want to pervert the course of natural childhood and adult roles; queers who 
relish the destruction of the family and have no allegiances or ties; and 
‘outsiders’ who cannot be trusted and are the agents rather than objects of 
inequality. It is the ‘gender ideologues’ and the perverse foreigners who are the 
hysterics, the ones who always go too far, the ones who have no core values. 
These framings are important as a way of deflecting or projecting aggression 
onto the targets of violence, of course, and are essential to both inflame anti-
‘gender’ feeling as legitimate, and its affective aggression as belonging to 
someone else. This article explores the spatio-temporal tricks that present 
gender equality as needing to be tempered by that common sense in the face of 
the destructiveness of both feminism gone too far, and reactionary cultural 
patriarchalism of the interloper. The focus throughout is on the affective life of 
anti-‘gender ideology’ claims, precisely as a way of trying to short-circuit that 
displacement effort. I explore its logic of the privileging of ‘sex’ as natural and 
complementary as precisely the locus of aggression, and make a claim for the 
importance of rooting feminist, queer and transnational approaches in anti-
white supremacist affect. Overall, I am interested in exploring feminist methods 
for undoing the misogynist, homophobic and racist fantasies of annihilation – 
their own and ours – as an urgent task for our troubled present. 
 
 
10 Pető, ‘Attack on Freedom of Education in Hungary’. 
11 Ilana Eloit, ‘American Lesbians are not French Women: Heterosexual French Feminism and the 
Americanisation of Lesbianism in the 1970s’, Feminist Theory 20: 4 (2019), 381-404. See also: 
Éric Fassin, ‘Gender Is/In French’, Differences: a Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 27: 2 (2016), 
178-97. 
12 Von Redecker, ‘Anti-Genderismus and Right-wing Hegemony’. 
13 Sonia Corrêa, ‘Gender Ideology: Tracking Its Origins and Meanings in Current Gender Politics’, 
Engenderings, 11 December 2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2017/12/11/gender-ideology-
tracking-its-origins-and-meanings-in-current-gender-politics/ 
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Spatio-temporal logics  
 
‘Gender ideology’ is described by feminist commentators as a convenient ‘empty 
signifier’ that constitutes a useful trope to unite resistance to a range of rights 
and equality claims, an insistence on closed borders, and a feeling of 
dissatisfaction as the global order shifts on its austere axis. Yet that emptiness 
should not mislead us into thinking that these attacks are only casually linked, or 
that the presence of anti-feminism at their heart is in any way accidental. Writing 
of anti-‘gender ideology’ in Brazil, Joseph Souza highlights ways in which ‘sexism 
[provides] a framework to connect right-wing ideologies of corruption, 
subversion and family values’ that form a ‘cognitive and affective glue’ between 
accusations against feminism that would otherwise not make sense.14  
For a range of commentators, the anti-feminism that campaigns against 
the invented phenomenon of a global ‘gender ideology’ is a backlash against 
equality gains and a political mechanism to safeguard privilege or lament its 
perceived loss.15 It trades in what the editors of the Signs special issue on 
‘Gender and the Rise of the Right’ describe as a ‘hostility to feminism’ that masks 
and contributes to the ‘very real inequalities and fears produced by 
neoliberalism and globalization’.16 Yet this anti-feminism is not entirely 
straightforward. In both its religious and political versions, anti-‘gender 
ideology’ activists cast themselves as on the side of women’s equality, and only 
antagonistic to a feminism that takes things too far, is too aggressively anti-
family or imposes itself on specific (often global south) contexts.17 In making 
‘gender ideology’ into the enemy of ordinary men and women, who want 
reasonable access to opportunity, relationships free from violence, or other 
improved conditions within conventional family frameworks, anti-‘gender 
ideology’ proponents claim the very ground feminism has called its own. Once it 
has been established that ‘gender ideology’ is what unites a range of challenges 
to the heteronormative modern family, claims for same-sex marriage, 
reproductive rights, sex education, trans* recognition or equal pay, being against 
it can be cast as a defence rather than an attack.  In challenging the excesses of 
‘gender ideology’ (the term itself casts ‘gender’ as form of political, 
propagandistic posturing), then, anti-feminists can be reassured that they are 
resisting affronts to natural sex roles, rather than refusing women’s equality per 
se.18  
Anti-gender discourse hinges on a utopian fantasy of a bankrupt present 
and future, one that can only be remedied by a return to the integrity of 
 
14 Sosa, ‘Subversive, Mother, Killjoy’, 738, 724. 
15 Corredor, ‘Unpacking “Gender Ideology”’ 614, 
16 Graff, Kapur and Walters, ‘Introduction: Gender and the Rise of the Global Right’, 550. 
17 Sara Garbagnoli and Massimo Prearo, La Croisade Anti-Genre: du Vatican au Manif Pour Tous 
[The Anti-Gender Crusade] (Paris, Textuel: 2017); Weronica Grzebalska, Eszter Kováts and 
Andrea Pető, ‘Gender as Symbolic Glue: How “Gender” Became an Umbrella Term for the 
Rejection of the (Neo)liberal Order’, Krytyka Polityczna [Political Critique] and European 
Alternatives, 13 January 2017, http://politicalcritique.org/long-read/2017/gender-as-symbolic-
glue-how-gender-became-an-umbrella-term-for-the-rejection-of-the-neoliberal-order/ 
18 Erica Millar makes a related argument concerning anti-abortion activists’ claims to be the real 
feminists, on the side of women’s happiness and well-being. Millar, Happy Abortions: Our Bodies 
in the Era of Choice, (London: Zed Books, 2017). Thanks to Victoria Browne for pointing to this 
important intervention. 
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naturalised and complementary sexual difference as the conventional bedrock of 
the local and the national, but with a twist. If women’s subordination can be 
framed as something that has already been addressed, then a return to sex 
difference within a heteronormative, nationalist imaginary can be framed as 
opening up a future that occupies a sane middle ground.19 As Kapya Kaoma notes, 
the very ‘future of the human family’ relies on this complementarity.20 A return 
to sex complementarity is thus cast as the foundation of a local, regional or 
national future at direct odds with the bankruptcy of current global hegemony.  
Those who continue to insist on excessive denaturing can be positioned as part of 
an apocalyptic drive to a non-reproductive, barren future, and can be belittled 
and discarded. Feminism joins anti-racism and anti-disablism in the bin marked 
‘political correctness’, and thus can be dismissed as absurd even as it is framed 
as a serious threat.  
There is a spatial dimension to this claiming of the modern ground of 
equality by anti-‘gender-ideology’ advocates which is overlaid on its temporality, 
and that contributes to the ability to align the ills of feminists, queer subjects and 
migrants. Anti-‘gender ideology’ positions ‘gender’ as a kind of import-export 
commodity and its misguided adherents as its cosmopolitan brokers. Key to the 
contrast made between the safety of heterosexual family and a corrupting 
‘gender ideology’, is where these come from and settle, as well as when they can 
be said to be appropriate. Anti-‘gender ideology’ arguments consistently 
construct ‘gender’ itself as an import, a foreign interloper that challenges the 
time and place of family and nation. In France, ‘gender’ is at once the ‘enemy 
within’ that tears at the very fabric of the sexual-democratic contract, and an 
exterior threat to ‘national security’ in the form of transnational politics and 
language. Thus, as Eric Fassin argues, ‘gender’ is problematic both for its 
challenge to the sovereignty of heterosexual sex difference, and because it is 
perceived as coming from America rather than being ‘home grown’.21 It is foreign 
in the sense of both origin and its untranslatability. That ‘foreignness’ does not 
have to come from a specific national context, however. It can also be positioned 
precisely as that ‘empty signifier’ of the unreasonable demands of a 
transnational elite, and the institutions that protect their interests.22 Thus in 
Eastern Europe, ‘gender’ is constructed as an imposed transnational EU or 
neoliberal threat to national sovereignty, a threat that true Poles, Hungarians or 
Romanians can resist being subject to. In this respect anti-‘gender ideology’ 
arguments suture naturalised (hetero)sexual difference to nation both as a 
return to the sanity of pre-‘political correctness’ and as a way of resisting global 
forces in a post-industrial, post-welfare, securitised world.  
To go back to the French context for a moment, if ‘gender’ and 
homosexuality are imports that threaten family and nation, then care must be 
 
19 Gabriele Dietze and Julia Roth, eds, Right-Wing Populism and Gender: European Perspectives 
and Beyond (Verlag: Bielefeld, 2020). See also Lynn Berg, ‘Between Anti-Feminism and Ethnicized 
Sexism: Far-Right Gender Politics in Germany’, in Post-Digital Cultures of the Far Right, eds. Mark 
Fielitz and Nick Thurston (Verlag: Bielefeld, 2020), 79-91, on the links between anti-feminism 
and anti-migration arguments in contemporary Germany. 
20 Kapya Kaoma, ‘The Vatican Anti-Gender Theory and Sexual Politics: an African Response’, 
Religion & Gender 6: 2 (2016), 282-292. 
21 Fassin, ‘Gender Is/In French’. 
22 Eszter Kováts, ‘Questioning Consensuses: Right-Wing Populism, Anti-Populism, and the Threat 
of “Gender Ideology”’, Sociological Research Online 23: 2 (2018), 528-38. 
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taken to ensure that ‘other’ threat to Frenchness - Muslim religion or identity - is 
also kept on the outside. This is where the sane temporality of equality is so 
important, and why anti-‘gender ideology’ proponents need to claim a moderate 
ground. While ‘gender ideology’ goes too far on the one hand, the patriarchal 
control of Islam threatens to pull us back into an excessive past. Here of course, 
‘Frenchness’ is always already neither Muslim, nor queer (and certainly not 
both). 23 The externalisation of ‘gender’ in this European context, then, ensures 
that heterosexual difference is always ‘secular’ and white, as well as 
quintessentially moderate within what Fassin terms ‘sexual nationalism’.24 For 
Kováts too, it is precisely the focus on authentic womanhood that ties anti-gender 
to anti-immigrant narratives of the national modern.25 This modern woman is 
neither alienated from her true sex, nor patriarchally subordinated to perverse 
Muslim maleness, and thus she is free to take up her natural role as her (white, 
heterosexual, male) partner’s democratic complement. Importantly, then, what 
we see consistently in right-wing anti-‘gender ideology’ arguments is an 
interweaving of naturalised gender with naturalised racial and religious 
difference. That right wing populist appeal to a newly ‘modern woman’ is not 
confined to the West, of course, as the Hindu framing of Muslims as pre-modern, 
excessive, and closely aligned with homosexuality also suggests.26  
 The claim that ‘gender’ is a foreign import or the preserve of a 
transnational elite class is a tactic that follows the time-honoured trick of 
blaming individuals or groups already viewed with suspicion or hostility for 
home grown ills and the economic and social difficulties that attend 
globalisation. And so it is perhaps not so surprising that it is the queer, the 
feminist, and the migrant that become over-associated with transnational elites 
and protection in anti ‘gender ideology’ discourse, while maleness, whiteness 
and heterosexuality are increasingly figured as bound to the local or the deflated 
national. So it is that white men emerge as under threat from progressive elites 
rather than imbued with power in their own right; they are the besieged, rather 
that the routine agents of misogynist, homophobic or racist violence.  
 A final externalising tactic that overlays space and time in anti-‘gender 
ideology’ discourse is the positioning of ‘gender’ as a colonial term, and its use as 
a continuation of lamentable imperialism. Citing Kováts, Corredor affirms that 
the ‘language equating gender ideology with colonization, imperialism, and 
unwarranted cultural imposition has been another prevalent strategy for the 
Global Right (Kováts 2017)’.27 Kaoma writes that ‘anti-gender arguments 
circulate in sub-Saharan Africa within a frame that portrays ‘gender’ and 
homosexuality as neo-colonial imports’, and as the contemporary imposition of 
 
23 See Fatima El-Tayeb for an analysis of the construction of Europeanness more broadly against 
both Muslim and queer subjectivities: El-Tayeb, ‘”Gays Who Cannot Properly be Gay”: Queer 
Muslims in the Neo-liberal European City’, European Journal of Women’s Studies 19: 1 (2012), 79-
95. 
24 Éric Fassin, ‘Sexual Democracy and the New Racialization of Europe’, Journal of Civil Society 8: 3 
(2012), 285-88. And in my own work on this context, I focus on the ways in which French anxiety 
about ‘Americanness’ allows for the promulgation of a nationalism stripped of its (displaced) 
racism. Clare Hemmings, ‘Is “Gender Studies” Singular? Stories of Queer/Feminist Difference and 
Displacement’, Differences: a Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 27: 2 (2016), 79-102.   
25 Kováts, ‘Questioning Consensuses’, 531. 
26 Graff, Kapur and Walters, ‘Introduction’, 554. 
27 Corredor, ‘Unpacking “Gender Ideology”’, 628. 
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transnational elites.28 And in a rather different frame, ‘gender ideology’ is cast as 
‘Western European’ in Poland or Turkey and thus corrupt or a-religious.29 On 
this broader scale, then, sexual and gendered challenges to heterosexual family 
are positioned as a malign import expressly designed to prevent ‘the nation’ 
from reproducing itself, whether that nation is a Western one that struggles to 
retain its history, or a postcolonial one that struggles to assert its freedom.  
 As Corrêa points out, the harnessing of a decolonial discourse by anti-
‘gender-ideology’ commentators who remain otherwise resolutely uninterested 
in anti-racist or decolonial politics is cynical at best.30 We might also want to 
point to the particular irony of critiquing feminists for their imposition of 
‘gender ideology’ by those who seek to re-entrench those naturalised categories 
of sex and gender that are the hallmark of a colonial endeavour. It is precisely 
those naturalised forms that are presented as the future, in other words, that 
have a violent and colonial past linked to colonial administrations and the 
suturing of sexed and gendered difference to whiteness. That future can only be 
rhetorically assured through displacement of its history onto contemporary 
feminist and queer subjects rather than the white heterosexual men and women 
who continue to benefit from its legacy.31 Disingenuous though it may be, this 
discursive framing of ‘gender equality movements [as] powerful and foreign 
colonizers’ does important political work.32 As Elzbieta Korolczuk and Agnieszka 
Graff highlight, it enables anti-‘gender ideology’ advocates to position themselves 
as ‘protectors of the world’s col/onized peoples, the disenfranchised and the 
economically disadvantaged.33 That mirroring of a colonial past with a global 
present thus allows for anti-‘gender ideology’ activists to link their nationalism 
and populism with decolonial resistance movements and anti-austerity activism 
rather than imperial projects in a profoundly ironic trick of the light.34  
It is more straightforward to counter the argument that authentic 
national identity is rooted in heterosexual sex difference, than the one that 
positions ‘gender’ and ‘homosexuality’ as colonial impositions, however. That 
colonial history is very real and present. The violence of ‘gender’ as a binary 
colonial imposition that regulates sexed and sexual behaviour in moral and 
 
28 Kaoma, ‘The Vatican Anti-Gender Theory’. The term ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ is Kaoma’s, and while 
general, is intended to link the significant gains of anti-‘gender ideology’ mobilisations in a range 
of countries.  
29 Michelle Gallo, Anti-Gender Movements: Comparing Poland and Colombia, Gender Centre 
Research Brief, Geneva Centre, Graduate Institute of International Development Studies (2020); 
Selin Çağatay, ‘Varieties of Anti-Gender Mobilisation: Is Turkey a Case?’ Engenderings, 2 April 
2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2019/01/09/varieties-of-anti-gender-mobilizations-is-
turkey-a-case/ 
30 Corrêa, ‘Gender Ideology’. 
31 See Catherine Hall, Nicholas Draper, Keith McClelland, Katie Donington and Rachel Lang, 
Legacies of British Slave-Ownership: Colonial Slavery and the Formation of Victorian Britain 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), for examples of these material and economic 
legacies. 
32 Elżbieta Korolczuk and Agnieszka Graff, ‘Gender as “Ebola from Brussels:” the Anticolonial 
Frame and the Rise of Illiberal Populism’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 43: 4 
(Summer 2018), 799. 
33 Korolczuk and Graff, ‘Gender as “Ebola from Brussels”’, 807-8. 
34 Alyosxa Tudor, Transgender Studies Quarterly (2021) ‘Decolonising Trans/Gender Studies: 
Teaching Race, Sexuality and Migration in Times of the Rise of the Global Right’, TSQ: 
Transgender Studies Quarterly 8: 2. 
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religious frames, and that marks ‘womanhood’ as white and either Christian or 
(later) secular, is a legacy that feminists need to continue to pay close attention 
to.35 Indeed, the violence of Western concepts of ‘gender’ continues to delimit 
identity and perpetuate the epistemic violence of exclusion and inclusion.36 It is a 
sober truth that this accusation (that ‘gender’ is colonial) is all the more available 
to the Right precisely because of that history, and indeed precisely because of the 
continued claims by some strands of feminism that women’s freedom and 
equality are most compromised outside of ‘the West’, or by queer scholars that 
gay and lesbian rights in their familiar Western form are a sign of ‘the modern’ 
that others must play catch-up to emulate.37  
It is feminist, queer and post- or decolonial thinkers who have pointed out 
how the flames of the fantasies of a specifically Western gendered and sexual 
‘modern’ as guiding global progress narratives are fanned by national elites 
committed to maintaining established power relations. I am thinking here of the 
important work by Rahul Rao on the citation of colonial imposition of gender 
binaries as both an important part of the history and present of power relations, 
and as a way in which contemporary investments in national gender and sexual 
inequalities are managed.38 Rao’s work is exemplary, precisely because it weaves 
a complex picture of those in power always working with the resources that they 
have at their disposal.39 In her intervention on anti-‘gender ideology’ and the 
Gulf region, Nour Almazidi writes in a similar vein of the ways in which national 
sovereignty is consistently imagined at the expense of sexual and gendered 
minorities within those contexts.40 For Almazidi, to back away from supporting 
gendered and sexual rights in those contexts because of the anxiety of 
reimposing colonial or Western frames is to cede the terrain. For these theorists, 
as for Uma Narayan writing about India over twenty years ago, the 
externalisation of gendered and sexual equality as a perverse imperial effect is 
one of the key ways in which progressive politics are foreclosed.41 We need then 
to wrestle gendered and sexual complexity back from right-wing anti-‘gender 
ideology’ advocates, insisting on the duplicity at the heart of their co-optation on 
 
35 See María Lugones, ‘Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System’, Hypatia: a 
Journal of Feminist Philosophy 22: 1 (February 2007), 186-219, on the colonial history of modern 
oppositional ‘gender’. 
36 Hortense Spillers and Gail Lewis write beautifully of the consequences of this imposition and 
history on black women in the US and the UK respectively. Spillers, ‘Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: 
An American Grammar Book’, Diacritics 17: 2 (1987), 64-81; Lewis, ‘Questions of Presence.’ 
Feminist Review 117 (2017,: 1-19. 
37 This critique has been very firmly established by writers including: Jin Haritaworn, ‘Women’s 
Rights, Gay Rights and Anti-Muslim Racism in Europe’, European Journal of Women’s Studies 19: 1 
(2012), 73-78; Joseph Massad, Desiring Arabs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); Jasbir 
Puar, ‘Mapping US Homonormativities’, Gender, Place & Culture 13: 1 (2006), 67–88; Mitra 
Rastegar, ‘Emotional Attachments and Secular Imaginings: Western LGBTQ Activism on Iran’, 
GLQ 19: 1 (2013): 1-29. 
38 Rahul Rao, ‘The Locations of Homophobia’, London Review of International Law 2: 2 
(September 2014), 169-99. 
39 See Rahul Rao, Out of Time: The Queer Politics of Postcolonality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2020).  
40 Nour Almazidi, ‘The Institutional and Epistemic Marginality of Gender Studies in the Gulf 
Region’, Engenderings, 14 January 2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2019/01/14/the-
institutional-and-epistemic-marginality-of-gender-studies-in-the-gulf-region/ 
41 Uma Narayan, Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions and Third Word Feminism (New York: 
Routledge, 1997). 
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the one hand, yet paying close attention to the multiple ways in which ‘gender’ 
travels with its historical and contemporary baggage of epistemological and 




As we have seen, anti-‘gender ideology’ mobilisations are suffused with violence 
and a sense of entitlement, and yet their aggression is deflected through the logic 
of naturalised sex difference as under threat, as about to disappear without 
immediate action. That negative affect (and its deflection or re-routing) is central 
to how anti-‘gender ideology’ arguments work, and here I want to spend more 
time on how this works narratively. I refer to these political and intersubjective 
techniques as the ‘affective fictions’ of anti-‘gender ideology’ logics as a way of 
making clear that feelings do not need to be ‘true’ to be powerful. In fact, as Eve 
Sedgwick and Lauren Berlant both make abundantly clear in their work on the 
draw of heteronormativity, affective investments in a structure that promises 
more than it will deliver are the very motor of contemporary life.42 Berlant 
brilliantly proposes ‘cruel optimism’ as the best way of explaining the hyperbolic 
investments in the futurity of naturalised kinship in the face of increased global 
austerity.43 For her, this optimism is ‘cruel’ because it invests in the very 
promises that kinship cannot deliver on, and indeed is part of the way in which 
neoliberalism reproduces itself. Reading anti-‘gender ideology’ movements as 
‘cruel’ is to emphasise how investment in heterosexual kinship and its related 
gender roles as reliable, appealing and (most of all) natural, works to offer what 
Gabriela Arguedes-Ramirez characterises as ‘some sort of ontological certainty’ 
in the face of global uncertainty of a wide range of kinds.44 
Yet if that optimism resides in the hyper-investment in sex difference and 
naturalised familial authority as a counter to the disappointments of austerity, 
its cruelty does not rest there. In anti-‘gender ideology’ discourse it locates the 
blame (and therefore the rage) firmly with those who are perceived to have 
gained from contemporary global shifts: the feminists, gay men and lesbians, 
whose rights seem to trump those of ordinary families; and migrants whose 
claims on a failing welfare state have produced economic insecurity for genuine 
citizens. The excavation of that terrible wound, which as discussed above centres 
a normative family as the subject of the future even as it laments its imagined 
displacement in the present, allows the Right to depict ‘religious conservatives as 
a embattled minority’.45 That loss, that heart-felt cry of pain by white 
heterosexual men at the perceived rolling back of their privileges: these are 
affects that only intensify with empirical information that counters the basis of 
that misery. It matters little, then, whether one can point to the ways in which 
racial, sexual and gendered minorities precisely do not experience austerity as a 
 
42 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1990); Lauren Berlant, ‘Cruel Optimism’, Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 17: 3 
(2006), 20-36. 
43 Berlant, ‘Cruel Optimism’. 
44 Gabriela Arguedas-Ramirez, ‘Gender Ideology, Religious Fundamentalism and the Electoral 
Campaign (2017-2018) in Costa Rica’, Engenderings, 7 November 2018, 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2018/11/07/gender-ideology-religious-fundamentalism-and-
the-electoral-campaign-2017-2018-in-costa-rica/ 
45 Korolczuk and Graff, ‘Gender as “Ebola from Brussels”’, 798. 
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boon. Starting from affect and narrative requires an uncomfortable encounter 
with the aggression at the heart of attempts to recentre an authoritative (usually 
white) masculine subject, one fantastically positioned as though he had lost his 
place at the heart of power. Kimberlé Crenshaw and I both instinctively knew 
that when encountering the anti-feminism of the man who interrupted the 
workshop at LSE, we had to get him out of the room, not try to persuade him into 
our way of thinking. It is unlikely this was a privileged subject in respects other 
than gender and race, but of course this is precisely Berlant’s point: his ‘cruel 
optimism’ requires an hyperbolic (aggressive) affirmation of gendered authority 
as an affective panacea. 
That ‘ontological certainty’ relies on a further powerful affective fiction: 
that authenticity is always already sutured to sex difference and cannot be 
claimed otherwise or elsewhere. That is why in anti-‘gender ideology’ rhetoric, 
‘gender’ itself is considered a fabrication, a foreign import or colonial imposition 
that has nothing to do with natural difference. Thus not only is ‘gender’ a 
disruptive force within and outside the family and nation, it is a lie that is 
peddled to distract ordinary men and women from the business of present and 
future citizenship and entitlement. ‘Gender’ is an abstraction, a pure fiction 
rather than a serious proposition: that is why it can be both dangerous and 
laughable. For Joni Cohen, this contrast between the naturalness of ‘sex’ and the 
abstraction of ‘gender’ lies at the heart of the ability to dismiss its politicisation 
of the family and nation: it can be mocked, even while it is constructed as all 
powerful.46 Indeed, in her perceptive transfeminist analysis, Cohen theorises 
‘gender’ itself not as ‘empty signifier’ but as a sign of a ‘rootless cosmopolitanism’ 
that precludes the possibility of a stable society. ‘Gender ideology’ is thus 
available to be linked to a range of other suspect ideologies and identities, 
through the casting of oppositions between rootedness and flux. For Cohen this 
is what links anti-‘gender ideology’ campaigns to anti-Semitism and nationalism. 
For Sarah Bracke and Patternotte, too, ‘gender ideology’ is ‘separated from the 
sphere of reality’ leaving only the truth of ‘rooted’ heterosexual gender roles, 
with their investment in that other ‘real’ of ‘race’ as national inheritance.47  
In pitting ‘real sex’ against ‘fake gender’, anti-‘gender ideology’ advocates 
position feminists, queers and foreigners not only as misguided about intimacy 
and the importance of family as national bedrock, but also – and perhaps more 
importantly - as inauthentic. They represent everything that is bankrupt within 
the current social order, and thus their claims for rights are not only dangerous 
but also fundamentally false. Feminists not only peddle lies about ‘gender’, they 
actively deny women (and men) access to ‘authentic’ womanhood. 
Homosexuality is not only ‘less’ than heterosexuality, it makes a mockery of it, 
and is at heart a violent failure to embrace the real intimacy of heterosexual 
complementarity, as we have seen in the French case. In this sense, ‘gender’ itself 
is given the status of a con, one that tricks its proponents and others into 
devaluing their own bodies, stripping themselves of the possibility of real 
 
46 Joni Alizah Cohen, ‘The Eradication of “Talmudic Abstractions”: Anti-Semitism, Transmisogyny 
and the National Socialist Project’, Verso Blog, 19 December 2018, 
https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4188-the-eradication-of-talmudic-abstractions-anti-
semitism-transmisogyny-and-the-national-socialist-project 
47 Sarah Bracke and David Paternotte, ‘Unpacking the Sin of Gender’, Religion and Gender 6: 2 
(2016), 143-54. 
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reciprocity, of masculinity and femininity. ‘Gender ideology’ is undignified and 
miserable, but it is also selfish and individualist – the opposite of communal 
social investment in kinship and locale. It trades in sad shadows of relationships, 
providing no stable affective ties; resisting it is thus a national duty based in love 
and care rather than aggression.48  
There is a similar logic at play in transphobic narratives that the reader 
will no doubt recognise. Anti-trans* arguments have long relied on the 
opposition between ‘real sex’ and ‘fake gender’ in order to underwrite the 
hostility towards trans* subjects as legitimate, and as you might expect, anti-
‘gender ideology’ advocates are profoundly transphobic as well as homophobic, 
misogynist and racist. Self-identified feminists too can be virulently transphobic, 
reaffirming ‘sex’ as real and ‘gender’ as a duplicitous fiction in ways that echo the 
aggression of anti-‘gender ideology’ arguments. Indeed, the work of trans-
exclusionary radical feminists (TERFS) always fails to take seriously trans* 
claims to dignity and self-determination, rendering trans* subjects similarly both 
unreal (and predatory) but also a joke.49 Alyosxa Tudor’s work intervenes here 
by linking the anti-‘gender ideology’ arguments of the Right, feminist 
transphobia and racism, stressing the importance of a decolonial perspective as a 
counter to the dehumanisation that recentres authentic binary ‘sex’ common to 
all three.50 Their work is also important in its refusal to reduce feminist history 
to transphobic history, however, insisting that where feminism takes seriously 
the colonial history of ‘sex’, it will also see the links between lesbian feminism 
and transfeminisms as deeply resonant and value laden.51 
Because ‘gender ideology’ is both unreal and a palpable threat, a mimic 
and mocker of authentic ties, the people who are its subjects do not have to be 
respected. And to continue to think of fictions, that inauthentic unreality of 
‘gender’ is precisely how centuries of feminist, queer and anti-racist political 
work are established as a chimeras, figments, ghosts. Even its grammar is elusive 
in this right-wing discourse: ‘gender ideology’ appears to have both agency and 
no firm ground; its subjects are deluded and absurd yet powerful; it is 
everywhere and nowhere, and its advocates are mere proponents of a dangerous 
 
48 Sara Ahmed, ‘Affective Economies’, Social Text 22:2 (2004), 117-39. 
49 Most recently JK Rowling has used this familiar mockery, positioning trans* claims to 
authentic womanhood or manhood as a farce any sensible man or woman would laugh at. This 
has a long history, with Germaine Greer famously mocking transwomen’s failed attempts 
to pass as women, echoing Janice Raymond’s similarly dismissive tone. I am not keen to provide 
citations to these three interventions, because it gives more authority to them than I would like. 
So let me point you to Tudor’s acerbic riposte to Rowling that turns this mockery right around: 
‘Terfism is White Distraction: On BLM, Decolonising the Curriculum, Anti Gender Attacks 
and Feminist Transphobia’, Engenderings, 19 June 2020, 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2020/06/19/terfism-is-white-distraction-on-blm-decolonising 
the-curriculum-anti-gender-attacks-and-feminist-transphobia/ 
50 Tudor, ‘Decolonising Trans/Gender Studies’. 
51 Alyosxa Tudor, ‘Im/possibilities of Refusing and Choosing Gender’, Feminist Theory 20: 4 
(2019), 361-80. I take my cue from Tudor’s work here, in that it offers a transfeminist 
perspective that reclaims decolonial approaches from the disingenuous right-wing claim that 
‘gender ideology’ trades (exclusively) in colonial categories. See also D-M Withers’ article on the 
overlapping histories of lesbian and transfeminist critiques of ‘gender’: Withers, ‘Laboratories of 
Gender: Women’s Liberation and the Transfeminist Present’, Radical Philosophy 2: 4 (Spring 
2019). 
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pseudo-science.52 The ‘affective fictions’ of anti-‘gender ideology’ discourse 
thereby provide the rationale and alibi for what Elsa Dorlin (following Marilyn 
Frye) describes as its ‘epistemics of obliteration’.53 Dorlin positions anti-‘gender 
ideology’ movements as governed by the logic of ‘semiotic extermination’. Once 
understood as inauthentic, Dorlin argues, queer lives can be understood as 
permanently assault-able as well as immoral: they will always be fair game. 
These ‘epistemics of obliteration’ mean that anti-‘gender ideology’ mobilisations 
can be framed as responses to violence rather than its agents, and it means that 
aggression itself is attributed to those who are in fact its targets. Only those who 
are real, are human, in the first place can be assaulted. For Dorlin, the attribution 
of violence to those on the margins means they are steeped in it, and also that 
they can never escape being accused of it, with the result that any violence done 
to them is inevitably understood as self defence.54 
In her recent book Imperial Intimacies, Hazel Carby represents the 
destructive modes of white supremacy that form these ‘affective fictions’ with 
searing accuracy, shifting the analytic and political direction from the history of 
‘blackness’ to the question of the lived violence of whiteness.55  Two examples 
strike me as particularly helpful for the discussion thus far. In the first, Carby 
tells us of her teacher who insists that the RAF does not have any black people in 
it. Carby knows for a fact that it does (her black father was in the RAF), but this is 
irrelevant to her teacher’s ignorant certainty.  The teacher’s knowledge that it 
does not trumps ‘the girl’s’ that it does; evidence is neither here nor there.  In the 
second, Carby’s white poor family embrace superiority over the enslaved black 
people of the Jamaican plantation as ‘white entitlement’, enjoying vicious 
pleasure at the horror others have to endure. Carby’s point here is that the 
affective life of white supremacy is key to its appeal;56 it provides a ‘cruel’ 
investment in the hierarchies that ultimately also diminish its white working 
class participants. As Carby’s bewildered childhood encounter with her ignorant 
teacher makes plain, white supremacy cannot be argued with or defeated at the 
level of logic: it has already identified her as outside of an epistemic frame of 
intelligibility. Her girlhood knowledge is at once untrustworthy, aggressive and 
absurd.  
 
Affective reckonings  
 
 
52 There are echoes of this idea of pseudo science in the ‘culture wars’ mocking of what are 
perceived to be fake disciplines (including media studies, cultural studies, and of course ethnic, 
queer and gender studies) through ‘hoaxes’. See Emma Spruce, Jacob Breslow and Tomás Ojeda, 
‘Study Your Grievances’, Engenderings, 29 October 2018, 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/gender/2018/10/29/study-your-grievances/ 
53 Elsa Dorlin, ‘Unreal: Catholic Ideology as Epistemological War’, Religion and Gender 6: 2 (2016), 
264-67. 
54 In her more recent work, Dorlin further contends that ‘self defence’ as a political and epistemic 
possibility is denied those on the margins; the are always primary agents of violence, never its 
mistreated objects. Dorlin, ‘What a Body Can Do’, Radical Philosophy 2: 5 (Autumn 2019). 
55 Hazel Carby, Imperial Intimacies: a Tale of Two Islands (London: Verso, 2020).  
56 In related vein, Sharon P. Holland explores the ordinary life of racism as a sequence of 
investments and affective ties one can never be distant from. Holland, The Erotic Life of Racism 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2012). 
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To conclude, I want to take forward Dorlin’s and Carby’s understandings of the 
‘epistemics of obliteration’ and the affects of white supremacy to think through 
how to challenge the personal and political violence of anti-‘gender ideology’.57 
How might I do justice to these authors’ understanding that histories of gender 
and race are a battle for survival not an exchange of views, are a struggle to 
outlive the murderous gaze that imagines itself vulnerable, not a desire for 
recognition? And finally, how might the question of ‘affective fictions’ be helpful 
for a political response that does not cede the terrain of sex/gender, race and 
sexuality to the Right? To do so I reconsider  Gayle Rubin’s analysis of the 
‘sex/gender’ system, reading it as an early analysis of the violent effects of 
naturalising ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, but also as an unfinished account of affect and 
violence.58 Rubin’s 1975 intervention, ‘The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 
“Political Economy” of Sex’ establishes ‘sex/gender’ not as a relationship 
between the body and the social, or between origin and endpoint, but as a 
coupling designed to obscure power relations within a patriarchal system.59 For 
Rubin, it is the collapse of ‘gender’ into ‘sex’, the naturalisation of their 
relationship as no relationship at all, that secures inequality as a fact of life rather 
than as a regime that systematically benefits men over women. In ‘Traffic’, Rubin 
is concerned both with that naturalisation mechanism (the collapse of ‘gender’ 
into ‘sex’) and with its impact on those who fall outside of its norms or refuse 
them. While ‘sex/gender’ as a system is universal for Rubin, so too are the 
ruptures and fissures in its logic that mean ‘oppression is not inevitable’.60 We 
have to make visible that ‘sex/gender system’, Rubin says, if we are to challenge 
the naturalisation process that reduces human life to ‘exchange’ and if we are to 
value the lives of those who cannot (or refuse) to be thus contained.61  
I read Rubin as an early theorist of the relationship between ‘sex’ and 
‘gender’ as a pernicious fiction, one that all gendered subjects must accept in 
order to be legible as ‘men’ or ‘women’ within patriarchal regimes. This is an 
affective regime too, of course, precisely because of that naturalisation as the 
central technique of power. If ‘sex’ is understood as pure and unadulterated, as 
without the corrupting presence of ‘gender’, its violence is obscured and can no 
longer be rationalised as violence. Following Rubin, this is one reason that anti-
‘gender ideology’ is so central to the Right: to admit to ‘gender’ is to disrupt the 
relationship between family and nation so crucial to anti-immigration and racist 
agendas that underpin it. Instead, as we have seen, violence ‘sticks’ to those who 
appear disruptive of a system whose workings have already been smoothed 
over. It is a ‘sex/gender system’, in other words, that allows for the aggression of 
anti-‘gender ideology’ mobilisations to be displaced, and for vulnerability to 
remain the preserve of the privileged. This is also an ‘affective fiction’, then, in 
that the cloaking of the mechanisms of authority enable anger at its exposure to 
be righteous, and disgust at those who refuse its terms to be justified. Rubin’s 
 
57 Dorlin, ‘Unreal’; Carby, Imperial Intimacies. 
58 Gayle Rubin, ‘The Traffic in Women: Notes on the “Political Economy” of Sex’, in Toward an 
Anthropology of Women, ed. Rayna Reiter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 157-210. 
59 Rubin, ‘The Traffic in Women’. 
60 Rubin, ‘The Traffic in Women’, 168. 
61 It is that impetus to value the bravery of lives and choices deemed ‘perverse’ that underwrites 
Rubin’s second major intervention some ten years later: Gayle Rubin, ‘Thinking Sex: Notes for a 
Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality [1984]’, in Deviations: A Gayle Rubin Reader (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2012). 
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account also goes some way to explaining why both agency and abjection stick to 
those at the margins: within a ‘sex/gender system’, legitimate affect can only 
belong to those who occupy its naturalised positions. Challenging the 
contemporary Right’s campaign to renaturalise power, then, has to start from 
both debunking that legitimacy, and insisting on the value of those lives whose 
affects bubble up in excess of that regime.  
Rubin has been critiqued for privileging ‘sex/gender’ over ‘race/gender’ 
as the determining system of patriarchal societies,62 and thereby naturalising 
colonial or imperial regimes in turn rather than opening them up to scrutiny. 
And indeed, as Spillers and Lewis have laid out, in Western contexts only white 
women can historically and contemporarily lay claim to womanhood and its 
affects without ambivalence at best and often deadly violence.63 Not only are 
black women and women of color more likely to be understood as aggressive 
than white women (because of rather than despite being more likely to be the 
targets of violence, this analysis has shown), they are also denied access to 
womanhood within a ‘sex/gender system’. For Carby, however, the racialization 
of a ‘sex/gender system’ is part of how it works. If ‘womanhood’ is naturalised 
through rather than in parallel to whiteness, then its impact is to demonise all 
those who ‘fail’ to allow that naturalisation to remain invisible, and punish all 
those who refuse that demonisation.64 In ‘White Woman Listen!’, Carby provides 
a generous reading of Rubin’s ‘Traffic’ as an important spur to denaturalising the 
‘sex/gender system’ as one that pushes all those who would challenge its 
obscuring logic to the edges of ‘the human’. Here Carby not only provides a 
useful extension of Rubin’s analysis of a ‘sex/gender system’ to centre the 
colonial logics of racism, she also provides a basis for thinking about the political 
and affective marginalisation of black people, people of color, queer, trans* and 
feminist subjects together (and those who might be all the above). Thinking with 
Rubin via Carby, then, allows us to explore the affective as well as political and 
social work that naturalisation does, but it also cracks open the links between 
different political responses as part of how we might imagine solidarity across 
different denaturalising positions.  
In an interview for the ‘Haunting Feminism’ special issue of Feminist 
Theory, Lewis reflects on her decades of political work as a black feminist in the 
UK.65 Echoing Dorlin’s insistence on understanding right-wing anti-‘gender 
ideology’ as a confrontation with ‘epistemic obliteration’, Lewis is clear that the 
Right has her and others in its deadly sights. ‘They’re going to kill us. They are 
killing us’ she says as a matter of fact.66 For Lewis, the violence of white male 
supremacy is not only an external force, but also one that shapes what it means 
to be oneself in the world. Lewis tells us that ‘it was hard for me to come out as a 
black woman as a lesbian’, remarking wryly that ‘I suppose when you’re excised 
 
62 Donna Haraway proposes this alternative conceptualisation in Haraway, ‘“Gender” for a 
Marxist Dictionary: the Sexual Politics of a Word’, Simians, Cyborgs and Women: the Reinvention of 
Nature (London, Free Association Books: 1991), 127-48.  
63 See footnote 35. 
64 Hazel Carby, ‘White Woman Listen! Black Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood’, in 
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, eds. The Empire Strikes back: Race and Racism in 70s 
Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1982), 212-235. 
65 Lewis and Hemmings, ‘”Where Might We Go if We Dare”’. 
66 Lewis and Hemmings, ‘”Where Might We Go if We Dare”’, 419. 
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from full humanity that’s one of its consequences.’67 Lewis is not making a case 
for being ‘recognised’ or granted entry to womanhood on authoritarian terms, 
though. She sees the problem as precisely rooted in the binary oppositions that 
anti-‘gender ideology’ movements propose as the basis of a rosy future, insisting 
that it ‘kills us to occupy these position as “men” and “women”’.68 Here Lewis 
connects black, trans*, queer and feminist exclusions through their continuous 
failure to be counted as full women or men, but importantly sees the costs of 
seeking entry into those as just as damaging.  
In an extended discussion of the racial dynamics that shape feminism, 
Lewis continues to explore the affective costs of occupying or being excluded 
from womanhood. Starting from her own experience on feminist collectives, 
Lewis describes ‘how unbearable it is… when you’re with some white women 
and the question of race comes up and the white women will collapse into tears, 
like a classic performance of the fey little woman, who’s not strong enough, like a 
little bird … she might faint.’69 In her trenchant analysis, Lewis points precisely 
to the ‘sex/gender system’ as always already racialised. As a black woman she is 
not able to retreat into femininity, and is marked instead and predictably as the 
aggressor. White femininity for Lewis is constituted through the ‘threat of an 
assault’ whether by (white or black) men or by black women; it is constituted by 
the displacement of racist violence and exclusion onto the other and as a black 
feminist that is simply ‘unbearable’. For Lewis, the confrontation with fantasies 
of victimhood as part of how a ‘sex/gender system’ maintains itself must be the 
first thing we undo as part of a creative politics of freedom (though this will be a 
different project for white and black feminists). Otherwise, one continues to see 
oneself through the eyes of the white male supremacist. A refusal to accept the 
‘affective fictions’ that underpin anti-‘gender ideology’ requires a leap of affective 
faith in its own right. Yet of course we are not starting from scratch. There is, and 
always has been excess and resistance and ‘our lives are never fully 
encompassed and limited by all of these processes and structures.’70 As Lewis 
notes, it ‘is frightening’, but ‘that’s the project. Isn’t it? We have to.’71 Here Lewis 
joins Rubin and Carby in returning us to the scene of ‘sex/gender’ as both an 
important political focus with respect to structures of violence, and as a way of 
understanding affective lives that separate and connect those it excludes. Her call 
is to refuse the empty (‘cruel’ perhaps) promises of sex/gender, refuse it as a 
devastating fiction, and align with affects rooted in histories of political action 
and affirmation. 
At the end of the interrupted ‘Intersectionality and Politics’ workshop, 
Kimberlé Crenshaw asks us to breathe, to pause, to feel our bodies. To inhabit 
that space and no other space. To be real. She asks us to go back and to 
remember what happened step by step and to finish it, leave it alone, pay it no 
more mind. And then to imagine something else. To replay the scene of being 
silenced, rewriting it as we would have liked it to unfold, and to take that with us 
into the world. We know authentic intimacy because it is hard won; we can feel it 
in our encounters with others. We know the sham in which violence is passed off 
 
67 Lewis and Hemmings, ‘”Where Might We Go if We Dare”’, 419. 
68 Lewis and Hemmings, ‘”Where Might We Go if We Dare”’, 416. 
69 Lewis and Hemmings, ‘”Where Might We Go if We Dare”’, 412. 
70 Lewis and Hemmings, ‘”Where Might We Go if We Dare”’, 415. 
71 Lewis and Hemmings, ‘”Where Might We Go if We Dare”’, 416, 419. 
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as kinship, and we do not accept its terms. We see each other, and we already 
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